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Summary by Covington & Burling
Of the Major Points of Their Opinion
The following is a summary prepared by Covington & Burling, the
Institute’s legal counsel, of its opinion of September 28, 1966, concern
ing the legality under the United States antitrust laws of Rule 3.03 of
the Institute’s Code of Professional Ethics. The full opinion appears
on pages 12-25.

I.
1. Rule 3.03 is, in effect, an agreement among the members of the In
stitute that they will not engage in price competition.
2. Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act prohibit all agreements
among competitors restraining price competition.
3. Such agreements are illegal per se, that is to say, they cannot
be justified on the ground that they are socially or economically de
sirable as, for example, by showing that price competition has un
desirable consequences or leads to unethical practices.
4. Rule 3.03 constitutes a restraint on price competition that is il
legal per se under the Sherman Act, unless for some reason the Sher
man Act does not apply to agreements among accountants in the same
way that it applies to agreements among those engaged in ordinary
5

commercial activities. This raises two questions: (1) does Rule 3.03
affect interstate trade or commerce, and (2) to what extent does the
Sherman Act apply to a profession such as accounting?

II.
1. The Sherman Act applies only to agreements and combinations
in restraint of “trade or commerce” among the states or with foreign
nations (Sec. 1) or in the District of Columbia or the territories or
between such jurisdictions and elsewhere (Sec. 3).
2. There is no reason to believe that the courts would hold that
the accounting profession is generally local or intrastate in character
or that Rule 3.03 would be without impact on interstate commerce.
3. We conclude that the Supreme Court is likely to hold that mem
bers of the professions are engaged in “trade,” within the meaning
of the Act, and therefore do not enjoy any general immunity from the
application of the Act.
4. We also conclude that, although the Supreme Court might
apply more lenient standards to the regulations of professional so
cieties than it applies to ordinary commercial transactions and hold
that some kinds of regulations of such societies designed to preserve
professional ethical standards are permissible, the Court is unlikely
to allow the members of professional societies to engage in price
fixing or to adopt rules of conduct that restrain price competition.
5. W e therefore conclude it is highly probable that the courts
would hold Rule 3.03 to be illegal.

III.
1. The possible legal consequences, if Rule 3.03 should be held
to violate the Sherman Act, depend on the nature of the legal pro
ceeding in which the violation is adjudicated.
(a ) The Department of Justice could bring criminal proceedings,
in which the penalties against each defendant could be a fine of
up to $50,000, or imprisonment up to one year, or both, for each
offense under each section of the Act.
6

(b ) The Department could also bring a civil suit to enjoin the en
forcement of Rule 3.03.
(c) The Department could also, in a civil suit, recover simple dam
ages for any money damage suffered by the United States or one of
its agencies that was caused by Rule 3.03.
(d ) Private persons, and states, municipalities and agencies thereof,
could also recover treble the damages suffered by them that were
caused by Rule 3.03, and could also obtain injunctive relief against
the enforcement of the Rule.
2. Among the situations which might cause the legality of Rule 3.03
to be raised in one or more of the above-described legal proceedings
are attempted enforcement of the Rule against a member of the
Institute and the inability of a governmental agency or public or pri
vate corporation to obtain competitive bids.
3. It is not possible to estimate the degree of risk that any such pro
ceeding will be brought. Reliance may not safely be placed, how
ever, on the fact that the Rule is of long standing and has yet to be
challenged in such a proceeding.

IV.
1. W hat has been said above applies equally to similar rules that
may be contained in the codes of ethics of state societies, to the extent
that such rules affect the conduct of members who are engaged in
interstate commerce.
2. The Institute’s members will not, however, violate the Federal
antitrust laws by obeying rules prohibiting competitive bidding pro
mulgated by state boards of accountancy or similar official agencies,
provided, first, that such rules are authorized by state law and issued
in conformity with the legally prescribed procedures, and, second,
that such rules are issued and enforced by an official agency that is
established and controlled by the state.
November 1 9 , 1966
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Text of the Opinion of
Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl
We are informed that competitive bidding by accountants is not
in the public interest. It is persuasively argued that any such form
of solicitation on the basis of price would shortly erode and eventually
undermine the high standards of professional service which must be
maintained by the members of this profession if they are effectively
to discharge their obligations to clients, to creditors and to the general
public. Rule 3.03 of the Code of Ethics of the Institute, accordingly,
states that:
A member or associate shall not make a competitive bid for a
professional engagement. Competitive bidding for public ac
counting services is not in the public interest, is a form of solici
tation, and is unprofessional.
We have been furnished with certain written opinions analyzing
the legality of this Rule under the Federal antitrust laws, and have
beep requested to set forth our conclusions with respect thereto. W ith
out repeating at length the authorities there cited, accordingly, we
will herein ask and answer three questions which we believed to be
basic in our consideration of this Rule.
These three questions are:
(1) Is Rule 3.03 subject to the Federal antitrust laws?
(2) Does Rule 3.03 violate these laws?
(3) What, if anything, should be done about it?
8

QUESTION ONE

Question: Is Rule 3.03 subject to the Federal antitrust laws?
Answer: The basic statute in the field of antitrust law, namely the
Sherman Act, applies to every agreement in restraint of interstate
trade in this country. Rule 3.03 is obviously “interstate” in its applica
tion, because it is a regulation of an interstate association, it controls
the operations of interstate as well as intrastate firms, and it affects
the offer of services to interstate business corporations. The Rule also
restrains “trade,” in view of the fact that it prohibits a form of com
petition by self employed individuals and firms in the furnishing for
profit of their services. In our opinion, accordingly, the Rule is sub
ject to this antitrust legislation.
The fact that the business involves the sale of personal services
rather than commodities does not take it out of the category of
“trade.” (U nited States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950) at p. 490.)
Admittedly, no court has directly ruled that agreements between
accountants—and thus Rule 3.03—are subject to the antitrust laws.
These statutes, however, have in the past been applied generally to a
wide variety of persons engaged in furnishing services, e.g., advertis
ing, brokerage, cleaning, insurance, investment banking, licensing, and
various forms of selling; they have been directed specifically to drug
gists and doctors; and they are being invoked currently in a new
investigation involving orthodontists and in a pending proceeding
against pathologists. Any assumption that accountants and Rule 3.03
are exempt from the antitrust laws would under these circumstances
suggest the triumph of hope over experience.

QUESTION TWO

Question: Does Rule 3.03 violate these laws?
Answer: The courts have interpreted the antitrust laws, in proceed
ings brought under the Sherman Act, to prohibit those engaged in
an interstate trade from entering into agreements to refrain from
competitive bidding. Executives, small businessmen and even local
plumbers have been individually fined and sentenced to jail for en
gaging in this form of competitive restraint. Rule 3.03, nevertheless,
in express terms proscribes competitive bidding. In our opinion, there
fore, the Rule is in violation of this antitrust legislation unless the
9

courts exonerate a practice by accountants for which they incarcerate
and fine other defendants. This, we believe, is unlikely to occur.
Any combination which tampers with price structures is en
gaged in an unlawful activity. ( United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) at p. 221.)
The courts have, of course, acknowledged that competition in price
under certain circumstances may be against the public interest. But
they have heretofore stressed that only a duly authorized regulatory
body of a state or Federal government may safely be entrusted with
the power to make this finding, and in the exercise thereof, to restrict
such price competition. The chances are slim that our courts will
permit any self-appointed organization of private persons, such as the
Institute—however well intentioned—to assert the governmental pre
rogative of banning a form of competition in price. Indeed, the odds
against the Institute’s obtaining ultimate Supreme Court approval
for any such assumption of governmental authority are so over
whelming that—while they might possibly appeal to the wagering—
they should scarcely interest the accounting profession.

QUESTION THREE

Question: What, if anything, should be done about it?
Answer: Three courses of action with respect to Rule 3.03 would
appear to be open to the Institute, in view of the answers herein given
to the preceding questions. These alternatives may be roughly de
scribed as “retention,” “repeal” and/or “replacement.”
(1) Retention: The members of the Institute may elect to reaffirm
their claim to some unique antitrust immunity for Rule 3.03 and may
therefore vote to retain it. If this Rule is thereafter invoked by the
Institute or by any of its members to justify a refusal to submit a com
petitive bid or to discipline a dissenting member who submits such a
bid, however, such action will invite a petition by the enforcement
agencies, by the adversely affected private persons, or by both, in
which the courts will be requested to cut the tenuous thread cur
rently holding the antitrust laws suspended over the Rule, and so
to determine with finality whether or not they will sever that Rule. In
falling, unfortunately, the antitrust sword may simultaneously impale
the Institute and its members with injunctions, with treble damages
and even with criminal penalties.
10

(2) Repeal: The members of the Institute may instead elect to
repeal Rule 3.03 and thereafter may rely upon other rules of the In
stitute to insure the maintenance of the high standards of the pro
fession. The American Bar Association has of course preferred to take
this route and thereby avoid any direct confrontation with the anti
trust laws. While a committee of the Bar Association in 1957 ventured
an “opinion” adverse to competitive bidding by lawyers, it may be
authoritatively asserted that any proposal to the Association suggesting
the adoption of a legal Canon of Ethics comparable to Rule 3.03 would
find little favor with the Section of Antitrust Law of that Association.
(3) Replacement: The members of the Institute, finally, may de
cide both to repeal Rule 3.03 and to petition the appropriate regula
tory agencies of the several states to adopt comparable rulings in
corporating the substance of this Rule. Fortunately, more than a ma
jority of the states are reported to have regulations which presently
ban competitive bidding by accountants, and the reasons which
have induced the promulgation of these rulings should be equally
appealing to the regulatory agencies of the remaining states. Certainly
officials responsible for the maintenance of accounting standards
should be more receptive to public policing of competitive bidding
than judges—who are directed to insure price competition—would be
to any private prohibition thereof. In short, it would seem to be pref
erable to ask state agencies to condone a restraint of price competi
tion than to invite Federal courts to condemn it.
It is respectfully recommended, therefore, that the members of the
Institute elect to repeal Rule 3.03 and to seek its replacement with
comparable state regulations.
October 2 0 , 1966
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Text of the Covington & Burling Opinion
This letter is written to confirm our oral opinions heretofore given
you concerning the legality under the United States antitrust laws of
Rule 3.03 of the Code of Ethics of the Institute, which prohibits com
petitive bidding; the possible legal consequences if the rule is unlaw
ful; whether our opinion as to the legality of Rule 3.03 would apply
to similar rules that may be contained in codes of ethics adopted by
state societies; and whether your members will necessarily violate the
antitrust laws if they obey rules prohibiting competitive bidding pro
mulgated by state boards of accountancy or similar official agencies.
The relevant statute is the Sherman Act, which, in Section 1, de
clares to be illegal “Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations,” and, in Section 3, declares to be illegal similar con
tracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce
“in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia,”
or “between any such Territory and another, or between any such
Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Col
umbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia
and any State or States or foreign nations.”*

I.
Rule 3.03 reads as follows:
A member or associate shall not make a competitive bid for a
professional engagement. Competitive bidding for public ac* The conduct prohibited by these Sections may also offend Section 2 of
the Act, as an attempt to monopolize or a combination or conspiracy to
monopolize.
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counting services is not in the public interest, is a form of solici
tation, and is unprofessional.
Whatever difficulties there may be in determining whether Rule
3.03 applies in particular situations, its general meaning is clear. It
means that the members of the Institute are not to attempt to obtain
clients by engaging in price competition. It is, in effect, an agreement
among the members that they will not engage in price competition.
Among the restraints of trade covered by Sections 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act are all agreements among competitors relating to prices.
W ith respect to this aspect of those Sections this prohibition is often
described as directed against price-fixing, but it is not confined to
agreements to fix particular prices or to fix a particular price level or
to agreements on uniform prices. It applies broadly to all agreements
among competitors that suppress or restrain price competition in
any way. As exemplary of the broad scope of the prohibition, we refer
to United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., et al., 310 U.S. 150
(1940), rehearing denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940), one of the leading
cases holding that price-fixing agreements are unlawful and defining
what is meant by price-fixing agreements. The Court in that case
stated,
Any combination which tampers with price structures is en
gaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of
the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market,
to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they
would be directly interfering with the free play of market forces.
The Act places all such schemes beyond the pale and protects
that vital part of our economy against any degree of interfer
ence. (310 U.S. at 221.)
In further elucidation the Court said:
Nor is it important that the prices paid by the combination
were not fixed in the sense that they were uniform and inflexible.
Price-fixing as used in the Trenton Potteries case has no such
limited meaning. An agreement to pay or charge rigid, uniform
prices would be an illegal agreement under the Sherman Act.
But so would agreements to raise or lower prices whatever ma
chinery for price-fixing was used. That price-fixing includes more
than the mere establishment of uniform prices is clearly evi
dent from the Trenton Potteries case itself, where this Court
noted with approval Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375,
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in which a decree was affirmed which restrained a combination
from “raising or lowering prices or fixing uniform prices” at
which meats will be sold. Hence, prices are fixed within the
meaning of the Trenton Potteries case if the range within which
purchases or sales will be made is agreed upon, if the prices
paid or charged are to be at a certain level or on ascending or
descending scales, if they are to be uniform, or if by various
formulae they are related to the market prices. They are fixed
because they are agreed upon. And the fact that, as here, they
are fixed at the fair going market price is immaterial. (310 U.S.
at 222-3.)
Even the foregoing specific catalog of unlawful price-fixing arrange
ments is not, and was not meant to be, all-inclusive. Thus in Sugar
Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), for example, the
Supreme Court held an arrangement unlawful even though it did not
involve an agreement to charge a fixed price, or an agreement to
raise or lower prices, or any formula related to market prices, or the
like, but merely an agreement to adhere to publicly announced prices
that the parties independently set themselves and were free to change
at any time.
There seems no room for doubt that an arrangement under which
the parties refuse to engage in competitive bidding is a price-fixing ar
rangement under the Act. See Swift and Company v. United States,
196 U.S. 375 (1905).
The courts have held not only that price agreements among com
petitors are illegal but that they are illegal per se. This means, among
other things, that such an agreement cannot be legally justified on any
ground. It cannot be justified, for example, on the ground that the
prices charged are not unreasonable. It cannot be justified on the
ground that in the absence of the agreement prices would be higher;
even an agreement to maintain a maximum price is unlawful per se.
Kiefert-Stewart Co. v. loseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951). It cannot be justified on the ground that it is designed to
prevent price competition that would lead to undesirable social or
economic consequences. As the Supreme Court has said,
Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting
and the like appear throughout our history as ostensible justifi
cations for price-fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were
to be appraised here, the reasonableness of prices would neces
sarily become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that event
the Sherman Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy
14

would be supplanted by one which is wholly alien to a system
of free competition; it would not be the charter of freedom which
its framers intended. ( E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Company, Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 221.)
In the same opinion, the Court said:
Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or
not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or
destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous
competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing
conspiracies. It has no more allowed genuine or fancied com
petitive abuses as a legal justification for such schemes than it
has the good intentions of the members of the combination. If
such a shift is to be made, it must be done by the Congress.
Certainly Congress has not left us with any such choice. (310
U.S. at 221-2.)
Perhaps as striking an example as any, of the fact that there can be
no legal justification for any of the agreements or combinations that
the Court has defined as illegal per se, is provided by Fashion Orig
inators’ Guild of America, Inc., et al. v. Federal Trade Commission,
312 U.S. 457 (1941), in which the Court held unlawful per se a com
mercial boycott, even though the boycott was initiated to prevent style
piracy and the Court assumed that such piracy constituted a legal wrong
against the parties to the boycott.
In summary, an agreement like the one in Rule 3.03, if made by
persons engaged in any ordinary interstate commercial activity would
be plainly unlawful per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
would also be unlawful under Section 3 of the Sherman Act if car
ried on in the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United
States or in commerce between the District of Columbia or any Terri
tory or any other place. This would be equally true if the persons in
volved were engaged in supplying commercial services instead of a
product. United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards,
339 U.S. 485 (1950).

II.
The preceding discussion leads us to the conclusion that the pro
hibition against price-fixing applies to Rule 3.03, unless for some reason
the Sherman Act does not apply to agreements among accountants in
15

the same way that it applies to agreements among those engaged in
ordinary commercial activities. This raises three questions that de
serve discussion:
( a ) The first is whether accounting services can ever be sufficiently
interstate in character to be subject to the provisions of the Sherman
Act. The application of Section 1 of the Act is limited to activities that
restrain interstate commerce. It might be suggested that accounting
is essentially a local activity, that accountants are not engaged in in
terstate commerce, and that, accordingly, the provisions of Section 1
of the Act do not apply to their activities.
In the past twenty years the courts have greatly expanded the con
cept of interstate commerce. Activities that historically were regarded
as local or intrastate have been held to be interstate in character. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that insurance, which for de
cades was held to be entirely local in character, is interstate com
merce within the meaning of the Act. United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The scope of the op
erations of modern accounting firms and the nature of the practice in
which many accountants are engaged, are such that there is no rea
son to believe that the courts would hold that the profession is gen
erally and essentially local or intrastate in character. There are un
doubtedly a substantial number of accountants whose practice is
largely local and who do not use extensively the channels and instru
mentalities of interstate commerce. But Rule 3.03 is not confined to
accountants in that position; it applies generally to all accountants
including those whose activities are undoubtedly interstate in charac
ter.
Moreover, the courts have held that the prohibitions of the Sher
man Act apply to activities that occur entirely within a single state,
if the effect of those activities is to restrain competition in interstate
commerce.
Taking into account all of these circumstances, it is our view that the
application of Section 1 of the Act to Rule 3.03 could not be defeated
on the ground that the Rule does not operate on or affect interstate
commerce within the meaning of the statute.
There is one additional comment that is relevant here. Section 3 of
the Sherman Act may be violated by activities that are conducted en
tirely within the District of Columbia or one of the Territories of the
United States and that have no impact on interstate commerce or
commerce between the District of Columbia and a Territory and else
where. By its terms Rule 3.03 is applicable to accounting services
performed in the District of Columbia or in the Territories. Any
16

attempt to apply the rule to such activities in accordance with its
terms would be subject to Section 3 even though no interstate com
merce was involved.
(b ) The second question is whether the Sherman Act applies
to the professions. By its terms the statute applies to activities that
restrain “trade or commerce.” It has sometimes been suggested that
the practice of a profession, such as law, medicine or accounting,
is not “trade or commerce” and that, accordingly, the Act does not
apply to those engaged in a profession.
This suggestion was made, for example, by way of dictum in
1922 in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200. That case involved the
question whether the Sherman Act was applicable to professional
athletic performances. The Court, in holding that baseball exhibitions
were not commerce and that the Act was therefore not applicable,
used language that can be read as indicating that at that time the
Court believed that the practice of law was not “trade or commerce”
in the statutory sense. 259 U.S. at 209.
Subsequently, the Court in another baseball case followed the
opinion in Federal Baseball, but only “so far as it ‘determines that
Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within
the scope of the federal antitrust laws.’ ” Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., et al., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Radovich v. National Football
League et al., 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957). The Court did so, not because
it believed Federal Baseball to have been correctly decided, but, as
the Court explained, only because the baseball industry had made
vast investments relying on the Court’s earlier opinion, because Con
gress had seen fit to take no action in the premises, and because the
Court believed that more harm than good would be done by over
ruling the earlier opinion. 352 U.S. at 450. Indeed, with respect to all
other professional sports, the Court in a later opinion made clear that
Federal Baseball is inapplicable to them and that they are subject to
the antitrust laws. E.g., Radovich v. National Football League et al.,
supra.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the procurement of
medical and hospital services is subject to the Sherman Act, American
Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), and al
though in that case and others the Court has had an opportunity to
reaffirm its Federal Baseball dictum concerning the inapplicability of
the Act to a learned profession, it has expressly avoided passing on
the question of whether the practice of medicine, or similar profes
sional activity, is trade or commerce within the meaning of the Act.
17

See, also, United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S.
326 (1952); United States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
Accordingly, it is correct to say that the Supreme Court has never
passed on the question of whether the practice of law, medicine or
accounting is “trade or commerce” within the meaning of the Sherman
Act. That Court has applied the Sherman Act to a provision in a code
of ethics adopted by an association of real estate brokers. United
States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, supra. The pro
vision involved standard rates of commission and provided that no
business should be solicited at lower rates. In its opinion in that case,
the Supreme Court said that it was expressing no view on the question
whether the Sherman Act applied to the professions. Accordingly, the
decision can be regarded only as a holding by the Supreme Court
that real estate brokers are not engaged in a profession.
However, twenty years ago the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, in a carefully written opinion, held that the practice
of medicine is trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman
Act. United States v. American Medical Ass’n et al., 110 F.2d 703
(1940). The opinion elaborately documented the fact that both in the
United States and in England the concept of “restraint of trade”
was applied at common law to the professions, as well as to other
callings and activities, and the opinion pointed out that the Supreme
Court has on numerous occasions recognized the relevance of the
common law to the construction of the Sherman Act. At a later stage
of the proceedings in the American Medical case, in another carefully
considered opinion written on behalf of a substantially different panel
of judges, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reaf
firmed its previous opinion. American Medical Ass’n v. United States,
130 F.2d 233 (1942). And very recently the same Court, but with
an entirely different panel of judges, tersely reaffirmed its AM A
opinions. Levin v. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals,
354 F.2d 515 (1965).
There is one holding by a single district judge that is contrary
to the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
that have been cited above. See United States v. Oregon State Medical
Society, 95 F. Supp. 103 (1950). The opinion in that case did not
discuss or analyze the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Dis
trict of Columbia or the authorities on which those decisions relied,
and it is to be noted that the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the District Court on other grounds without approving or adopting
the holding that the practice of medicine is not trade or commerce
within the meaning of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Oregon
State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
18

Although state cases construing state antitrust laws are not con
trolling on the question with which we are here concerned, they are
not entirely without relevance.
In Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Soc., et al.,
237 P.2d 737 (Wash. 1951), the Washington Supreme Court was
concerned with the application of an antitrust provision of Washing
ton’s Constitution to the professions. The particular provision pro
hibits any person from combining or contracting with any other per
son “for the purpose of fixing the price or limiting the production
or regulating the transportation of any product or commodity.” The
Court held that the word “product” should be construed to include
professional services. Its reason was stated as follows:
As our constitutional provision bespeaks the common law, so
it should be permitted to afford the same protection and serve
the same broad public interest which is available at common law.
Monopolies affecting price or production in essential service
trades and professions can be as harmful to the public interest
as monopolies in the sale or production of tangible goods. The
constitutional provision was designed to safeguard this public in
terest from whatever direction it may be assailed. The language
used must therefore be liberally construed with that end in view.
(237 P.2d at 765.)
In Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hospital Association et al., 376
P.2d 568 (Cal. 1962), the California Supreme Court was concerned
with whether a California antitrust statute, known as “the Cartwright
Act,” applies to the professions. The Cartwright Act makes unlawful
any “trust,” which is defined as “a combination of capital, skill or acts
by two or more persons” for a number of purposes including the fol
lowing: “(a) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce,
(b ) To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of mer
chandise or of any commodity, (c) To prevent competition in manu
facturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise,
produce or any commodity.” The Court held that inasmuch as the
language of the Act did not include the term “profession,” the pro
fessions were not intended to be subject to it. The Court’s reason for
so holding was that in other contemporaneous antitrust legislation
passed at the same time as the Cartwright Act,
. . . the word “profession” was included among the terms describ
ing the scope of the legislation, notwithstanding the fact that the
words “trade” and “business” were also used. . . . The difference
in terminology between this section and the Cartwright Act may
19

be viewed as indicating the act was not intended to apply to the
professions. (376 P.2d at 570.)
The Court went on, however, to hold that as to matters not covered
by the Cartwright Act the common law on restraints on trade applied,
that at common law restraints on the practice of medicine were unlaw
ful, and that, therefore, plaintiff had a common law action for being
excluded from hospital privileges by the defendant hospital. The de
cision can, therefore, be regarded as holding that the practice of medi
cine is a trade within the meaning of the common law rules.
Our review of the decisions in the Federal courts discussed above,
and of a number of other cases in which the Supreme Court has
shown a disposition to give the Sherman Act broad application, leads
us to conclude that it is likely that the Supreme Court would hold
that the professions do not enjoy any general immunity from the
application of the Sherman Act.
We see nothing in the two Texas cases to which our attention has
been called that reflects adversely on the foregoing conclusion. The
cases are Cochran County v. W est Audit Co. et al., 10 S.W.2d 229
(Tex. Civ. App., 1928), and Stephens County v. J. N. McCannon, Inc.,
52 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Sup. Ct., 1932). These cases hold, respectively,
that a Texas statute requiring the letting of certain contracts on com
petitive bids does not apply to a contract for accounting services
or to a contract for architectural services. Neither case has any bearing
whatever on the question of whether the Sherman Act is applicable
to an agreement between professional persons not to engage in com
petitive bidding.
(c) The third question is whether the courts, without giving the
professions any general immunity from the Sherman Act, might apply
more lenient standards to the rules and regulations of professional
societies than they apply to ordinary commercial activities and hold
that rules designed to preserve professional ethical standards are per
missible even though analogous rules might be unlawful in an ordinary
commercial context. There is one passage that suggests this possibility
in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Oregon State Medical
case, 343 U.S. at 336. It is our opinion, however, that the Supreme
Court is not likely to adopt any rule of law that would permit the
members of a professional association to engage in price-fixing agree
ments or combinations. The Supreme Court does not look with favor
upon broad exemptions from the Sherman Act and certainly it does
not look with favor on any relaxations of the prohibition against
arrangements that restrict price competition. The Court might permit
the members of a professional association to adopt certain kinds of
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regulations designed to prevent unethical conduct, as, for example, a
rule against advertising or actual solicitation. But any indulgence that
the Court might show the professions in this respect would, we be
lieve, be limited and would not be likely to extend so far as to allow
the members of the associations to engage in price-fixing or to adopt
rules of conduct that restrict price competition.
On the basis of this analysis we believe it necessary to conclude
that, if the legality of Rule 3.03 should ever be challenged in a pro
ceeding brought under the Sherman Act, it is highly probable that the
Rule would be held to be unlawful.
In arriving at the opinion expressed above on the legality of Rule
3.03 we considered the fact that in 1957 the Ethics Committee of the
American Bar Association issued an opinion that competitive bidding
was unethical under the Canons of Ethics of the Association forbid
ding solicitation or advertising (Opinion 292). We do not regard
this opinion as authoritative on the legal question now under con
sideration. The American Bar Association has no canon of ethics di
rected against competitive bidding, and the opinion represents simply
the opinion of those persons who happened to be members of the
Ethics Committee at that time on the interpretation and application
of the Canons that forbid solicitation or advertising. There is no in
dication in the opinion that the members of the Committee considered
the possible application of the Sherman Act to the particular interpre
tation of the Canons that they were adopting. In this connection it
should be observed that the Ethics Committee of the American Bar
Association has said in a number of its opinions that it does not pass
on questions of law. We seriously doubt whether the Ethics Com
mittee of the American Bar Association today would issue a similar
opinion, particularly if the members were required to consider the
significance of the opinion in relation to the possible application of the
Sherman Act. Our doubt is supported by the present position of the
American Bar Association on the question of minimum fee schedules.
The June 1966 issue of Legal Economic News, which is published by
the Standing Committee on Economics of Law Practice of the Amer
ican Bar Association, discusses the policy of the Association on min
imum fee schedules. The policy is not to endorse mandatory minimum
fee schedules but to regard all fee schedules as advisory only. The
matter of minimum fee schedules, relating as it does to charges for
professional services, is so closely akin to competitive bidding that it is
reasonable to regard the Bar Association’s policy on the question of
minimum fee schedules as throwing light upon the attitude of the Bar
Association toward any absolute and unqualified rule with respect to
the practices of its members concerning pricing for services.
In any case we should like to emphasize that the opinion that we
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have expressed on the legality of Rule 3.03 does not rest on any as
sumption that the status of the legal profession under the Sherman
Act differs in any significant respect from the status of the accounting
profession.

III.
The possible legal consequences, should the question of the legality
of Rule 3.03 be raised and adversely decided in a legal proceeding,
would depend upon the kind of legal proceeding in which the de
cision was made.
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice can bring
criminal proceedings to punish violations of the Act. These proceed
ings are usually initiated by an indictment returned by a grand jury.
The Institute itself could be the defendant in such a proceeding. A
member of its Council or any of its officers or agents, who had auth
orized, ordered or done anything to enforce, to apply or to interpret
Rule 3.03 might also be a defendant. Any defendant found guilty in a
criminal proceeding may be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned
for not more than one year, or both. These penalties may be imposed
for each offense under each section of the statute. Thus, in a case that
involved violation of both Section 1 and Section 3 a fine in excess
of $50,000 could be imposed.
The Antitrust Division could, in addition to a criminal suit, also
bring a civil suit to enjoin the enforcement of Rule 3.03. To win a suit
of that kind the Antitrust Division would merely have to convince the
court that Rule 3.03 was unlawful. It would not have to prove any
injury or money damage to anyone. If the Antitrust Division should
win that suit, the court not only could enjoin the Institute and its
members from enforcing the Rule but could also affirmatively require
the Institute to abolish the Rule.
The Antitrust Division can also sue to recover simple damages
in any case in which the enforcing of the Rule has inflicted money
damage upon the United States or any of its agencies. In a case of that
kind the Antitrust Division would have to prove the United States
or one of its agencies had actually suffered money damage that was
caused by Rule 3.03.
Private persons are also entitled to sue under the antitrust laws.
A private person is entitled to sue and recover treble damages, plus
a reasonable attorney’s fee, for any injury inflicted upon it by a viola
tion of the antitrust laws. To succeed in a suit of this kind a private
person would have to prove that in fact he had suffered money dam
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age because of the effects of enforcement of Rule 3.03. A private
person can also sue for injunctive relief. This means that a private
person could sue the Institute, the members of its Trial Board or
others to prevent them from enforcing Rule 3.03 against him.
As long as Rule 3.03 remains in the Code of Ethics there is a risk
that something may occur that would cause someone to challenge
the legality of the Rule by one or more of the various forms of legal
proceedings that have been described. This might happen, for ex
ample, if the Institute should enforce the Rule against some individual
member, either by expelling him from the Institute or by suspending
his membership. If that should happen, the individual might com
plain to the Department of Justice and be successful in instigating
action by the Antitrust Division. The individual might also seek to
avail himself of the private remedies described above.
The challenge to the legality of the Rule might be instituted by
someone who is aggrieved because he could not obtain competitive
bids for accounting services. This might happen, for example, in the
case of a municipal agency or corporation which was unable to obtain
competitive bids because members of the Institute were complying
with the Rule. The agency or corporation might institute legal pro
ceedings on its own as a private person or it might complain to the
Department of Justice and thus instigate the Antitrust Division to
start proceedings. The same thing could happen in the case of a Fed
eral agency of some kind which had been thwarted in its attem pt to
get competitive bids. While the Federal agency probably could not
sue independently, it could certainly complain to the Antitrust Di
vision and it must be assumed that its complaint would get very
serious attention.
It is not possible to predict with certainty that any of these things
will happen or to estimate in precise terms the risk that they will
occur. It should not be assumed, however, that they will not occur
merely because Rule 3.03 has been in the Code of Ethics for many
years and has never been attacked as a violation of the antitrust laws.
There have been a number of instance in which practices of long
standing whose legality has generally been assumed have been suc
cessfully attacked under the antitrust laws. One well-known example
is the successful suit that the Antitrust Division brought against in
surance companies even though the courts had held for many years
that the business of insurance was not interstate commerce. United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, supra.
In this connection it should be noted that the Antitrust Division
has not hesitated to bring criminal or civil proceedings against profes
sional organizations on the ground that their activities have violated
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the antitrust laws. It brought the criminal proceeding against the
American Medical Association and the Medical Association of the
District of Columbia, and the civil proceeding against the Oregon
State Medical Society which resulted in the decisions that have been
discussed earlier in this opinion. In July of this year the Antitrust
Division filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois against The College of American
Pathologists. The complaint charged the defendants with fixing prices
for conducting and reporting bioanalytical tests made by medical
laboratories. It also charged that the defendants had combined to re
strict the performance of these services to medical laboratories owned
or operated by pathologists. There is some reason to believe that this
case may involve the legality of rules of professional conduct adopted
by The College of American Pathologists.

IV.
W hat has been said so far about the legality of Rule 3.03 also ap
plies to similar rules that may be contained in codes of ethics adopted
by state societies. Insofar as the rules of state societies operate only
on intrastate activities and have no effect on interstate commerce they
are not subject to the Federal antitrust laws. But to the extent that
those rules affect the conduct of members who are engaged in inter
state commerce, as many members of state societies undoubtedly are,
the rules of law that have been discussed above would apply.
In many states, boards of accountancy or other state agencies have
adopted rules of professional conduct that prohibit competitive bid
ding. We understand that there are thirty-seven states in which a
state agency has promulgated a rule of this kind.
In 1943 the Supreme Court held in a case arising in California that
state action, or official action directed by a state, that results in re
straint of trade is not prohibited by the Sherman Act. Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341. Under the general principle announced by the Supreme
Court in that case and cognate cases, a rule against competitive bid
ding issued by a state board should not be subject to attack as a
violation of the Sherman Act. It follows that members of the Insti
tute who comply with the state regulation prohibiting the making of
competitive bids could not be successfully prosecuted by the Anti
trust Division or sued by a private litigant under the antitrust laws.
For this principle to apply, two conditions must be satisfied. First,
state regulation must be in conformity with state law. This means
that the state agency that issues the rule must have authority under
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state law to promulgate a rule prohibiting competitive bidding. It
also means that a state agency must issue a rule against competitive
bidding in conformity with any procedures the state law requires a
state agency to follow. (For example, if state law requires that rules
of professional conduct be issued only after notice and a public hear
ing, then the state agency must have complied with that requirem ent.)
Second, the state board or other agency that issues a rule must be
an agency which is established and controlled by the state so that it is
clear that the action of the agency is state action and not simply ac
tion taken by a private group. This point may be amplified in this way:
A state law might authorize accountants or members of other pro
fessions to issue regulations covering their professional conduct. The
decisions indicate, however, that this kind of permissive legislation
does not authorize an association of private persons to issue rules of
professional conduct that violate the antitrust laws. In addition to
Parker v. Brown, supra, see also Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade,
Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 263 F.2d 502 ( 4th Cir. 1959);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690
(1962) (discussion of action taken by defendant under permissive
Canadian statute). Rules of professional conduct are not immune from
application of the antitrust laws unless they are issued, commanded
and enforced by an official agency that is established and controlled
by the state. To reach a final opinion as to the situation in a particular
state, it would be necessary to make a detailed and careful review of
the statutes in that state to determine whether its statutes authorize
the state board to issue the regulation in question. It would also be
necessary to make a careful and detailed review of the state statutes
that govern the procedures and practices of the state board to de
termine whether the board was a true agency of the state and whether
its action was official state action. We have not attempted to make
that kind of detailed review and the present discussion is designed
merely to indicate the standards that should be applied in making
such a review.
September 2 8 , 1966
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